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Abstract
There is a large body of anecdotal evidence from sub-Saharan Africa of wide-
spread medical distrust leading to health program failures. In this paper, to isolate
an exogenous variation in trust in medicine to explain contemporary health de-
mand in sub-Saharan Africa, we rely on a widespread historical shock: the slave
trade. We combine Nunn and Wantchekon’s (2011) historical data on the slave
trade by ethnic group with geolocated individual-level data at the district level
from the 2010-2014 Demographic and Health Surveys to examine the reduced-form
relationship between ancestors’ exposure to the slave trade and children vaccination
status against measles. Exploiting within-district variation, we find that children
from mothers whose ancestors were exposed to the slave trade are less likely to
be vaccinated. The effect is larger than that of standard determinants of health
demand, such as education or revenue. Falsification tests, exploiting other health
behaviors, show that the slave trade affects demand for vaccination only through
trust in medicine. We then provide explanations for the persistent effect of the slave
trade on trust in medicine. We find large treatment heterogeneity along a set of
important characteristics linked to cultural transmission, in particular matrilineal
lineage systems, which shows that the transmission mechanism is not necessarily
monotonically increasing in the exogenous material payoffs associated to mistrust.
We also point to the similarity of the environment across generations, due to colonial
and contemporaneous abusive medical treatments, to explain persistence of optimal
mistrusting behavior.
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1 Introduction
Despite improvements in health technology and access, immunization rates in sub-Saharan
Africa remain very low. While we can observe significant differences across countries, none
of them reaches the herd immunity level that guarantees the protection of the entire pop-
ulation against the spread of highly infectious diseases such as measles (World Health
Organization 2018). The main explanation given by the extant literature is imperfect
information on illness prevention due to both low penetration of public health commu-
nication media and low education levels (Dupas 2011b). More specifically, a series of
studies using randomized field experiments confirm that providing information can have
substantial impacts on health behavior.1 They also point out that a discrepancy between
actual and optimal behaviors remains even with perfect information, mainly due to the
low education levels. In other words, even if the information is easily accessible, it is dif-
ficult for individuals to process it, underlying a limited cognitive-ability channel in health
behavior.2
However, evidence cries out for the consideration of another potential ground, namely
the medical distrust. In this respect, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2015
is highly illustrative. ABC News, on July 28th, 2014, titled: “Doctors battling Ebola
are met with fear, mistrust” (Neporent 2014). The New York Times on March 13, 2015,
in turn, titled: “Vaccines face same mistrust that fed Ebola” (Fink and Onishi 2015).
In its July 2015 report, the World Health Organization mentions the particular case of
Mohamed Soumah, 27 years old living in Guinea, the first person to receive the Ebola
vaccine: “It wasn’t easy. People in the village said that the injection was to kill me.
I was afraid. I was the first one to be injected, the very first, here in my village on
23 March 2015” (World Health Organization 2015). However, medical mistrust is not
confined to Ebola. For instance, Feldman-Savelsberg et al. (2000) report how in 1990 a
1For instance, Dupas (2011a), in an experiment in Kenya, finds that adolescent girls are responsive
to information provided on the relative risk of contracting HIV by type of partners. An experiment in
India conducted by Jalan and Somanathan (2008) shows that informing households that their drinking
water is contaminated with fecal bacteria can affect their adoption of purification techniques.
2Dupas (2011b), building on Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989), discusses the differential complexity
between passive contraceptive methods such as swallowing pills and more active rhythm methods requiring
more active computation and cognitive skills.
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rumour in Cameroon that public health workers were administering a vaccine to sterilize
girls and women, led Cameroonian schoolgirls to “squeeze through doorways and leap
from windows to flee the vaccination teams that were visiting their schools as part of a
campaign to decrease neonatal tetanus”.
Thus, trust comes into play in understanding demand for vaccination. There are
few emerging papers that provide evidence of the importance of trust in medicine to
explain demand for health. Significant contributions are from Alsan and Wanamaker
(2017) who study the effect of Tuskegee syphilis experiment disclosure in 1972 on black
men’s contemporaneous demand for health and participation in medical experiments. In
the same vein, Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann (2018) study the effect of the disclosure of
the 2011 fake vaccination campaign in Pakistan as cover for CIA during the operations to
locate and capture Osama Bin Laden. More related to our work is the study by Lowes and
Montero (2018a), which investigates the effect of colonial medical campaigns in central
Africa between 1921 and 1956 on present day trust in medicine. While they use an
innovative and robust approach, these studies exploit isolated and geographically limited
shocks that could not account for the global low demand for vaccination in sub-Saharan
Africa that we investigate.
In this paper, to isolate an exogenous variation in trust in medicine, we rely on a
more widespread shock in Africa’s history: the slave trade that has occurred over five
centuries, from 1400 to 1900. We build on previous work by Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011), who empirically establish a causal effect of past exposure to the slave trade and
a culture of mistrust, and on theoretical insights from Bowles (1998) to argue that the
slave trade could have explanatory power in situations distinct from the institutional
environment that accounts for its impact. To further base our argument on empirical
evidence, we use individual-level data from the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, combined
with Nunn and Wantchekon’s (2011) data on slave exports by ethnic group. First-stage
estimates show that past exposure of ancestors to the slave trade represents a relevant
(weak) instrument for trust in medicine, with the former being negatively associated with
descendants’ current trust in health workers.
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We then estimate the reduced-form relationship linking children vaccination status
against measles to ancestors’ exposure to the slave trade and to the other exogenous re-
gressors. We use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) female module,
collected in the period 2010-2014. The survey respondents are geolocated at the district
level, which corresponds to the primary sampling unit: village, city, municipalities. In
particular, the surveys provide information on mothers’ children (under five years) vac-
cination status. The immunization data are then combined with the historical data on
the slave trade by ethnic group. We exploit variations in the exposure to the slave trade
both within countries and districts. Adopting a within district estimation strategy is the
best way to control for unobserved differences in health supply and quality as well as for
any institutional differences between different districts in the same country, which may be
correlated with the slave trade. This implies that the source of identification is the movers
in the sample, that is, those who relocated from their ancestors’ original ethnic homeland
and who bring variation in exposure to the slave trade across ethnic groups in their new
locations. While we can expect that movers may not be representative of the population,
based on the literature on migrants’ higher level of civicness(Casari et al. 2018), we argue
that the effect of the slave trade would be downward biased. Alternatively, there may
be other omitted historical events or pre-colonial cultural norms that are correlated with
the slave trade and subsequent demand for vaccination. In particular, we could expect
that ethnic groups that were culturally more inclined to adopt preventive measures in
general were less likely to be enrolled in the slave trade, and continue to be more in favor
of preventive medicine today. To rule out this possibility, we control for ethnic group ini-
tial cultural preferences for preventive behavior, using data on pre-colonial ethnic group
norms from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas database. We further include indi-
cators on the type of ethnic groups pre-colonial political succession, whether hereditary
or not, to capture parents incentives to invest in children health. We further use data
from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) to include controls for colonial intervention
characteristics at the ethnic group level resulted in potential health and political ethnic
distance.
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Our findings indicate a significant adverse effect of ancestors’ exposure to the slave
trade on descendants demand for vaccination. More specifically, a child with a mother
belonging to a slave raided ethnic group is (at least) 5 percentage points less likely to be
vaccinated against measles than a similar child with a mother from a slave free ethnic
group. This effect offsets or even dominates the effect of standard determinants of health
demand, such as income and education. Implementing a counterfactual analysis, this
estimate predicts a 25% increase in the coverage rate for the ethnic group with the lowest
immunization rate in the sample had they been a slave free group, leading to a 50% drop
in measles incidence rate.
We further develop two falsification tests. If the slave trade affects demand for vacci-
nation only through trust in medicine, then a negative relationship between slave trade
exposure and trust-insensitive health demand outcomes should not exist. Building on
Dupas (2009) that finds that malaria preventives use is sensitive only to liquidity con-
straint, and on Lowes and Montero (2018a) that uses blood test consent as a revealed
preference measure of trust in medicine, we examine the reduced-form relationships be-
tween the slave trade and the use of malaria insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) on one side,
and the consent to an anaemia blood test on the other side. As expected, we find no
statistically significant relationship between the slave trade and malaria preventives use,
but a statistically significant negative relationship between the slave trade and blood test
consent.
Having established the adverse effect of past exposure to the slave trade on current
trust in medicine and subsequent demand for vaccination, the natural question that we
face, though, is how to explain the persistence of this effect. Both economics and evolu-
tionary anthropology approaches have underlined different channels. First, we shed light
on cultural transmission mechanisms by documenting heterogeneity of the slave trade
effect. We find that both religious affiliations and matrilineal lineage systems are impor-
tant channels of cultural transmission. More specifically, affiliation to traditional religions
and belonging to ethnic groups with matrilineal lineage increase respectively twofold and
fourfold the adverse effect of slave trade exposure on contemporaneous demand for vacci-
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nation. Second, insights from evolutionary anthropology models predict optimal adoption
of previous generations norms and traditions in the presence of similarity of environment
across generations. We point to colonial and contemporaneous abusive medical treat-
ments to explain cultural persistence of optimal mistrusting behavior inherited from the
slave trade.
This paper contributes to three main streams of research. Our work complements
studies documenting the long-term adverse effect of the slave trade through a mistrust
channel. In particular, to the pioneer work by Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011), this paper provides evidence and explanation for the legacy of the slave trade in
situations distinct from the institutional environment in which it initially occurred. Our
work also speaks to the cultural transmission literature. While there is an extensive theo-
retical literature in several social sciences about cultural transmission, empirical analysis
of cultural transmission models are scarce and do not confront the various approaches.
In this paper, we show that both economic and evolutionary anthropology approaches
could be useful to explain the dynamics of cultural attitudes. We also identify specific
cultural transmission mechanisms that could shed light on the economic outcomes associ-
ated with some cultural traits. Finally, for the health literature, we unveil the importance
of long-term historical origins to better understand contemporary demand for health.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the validity of the slave
trade as an instrument for trust in medicine. In Section 3, we turn to the description of
the data before reporting our reduced-form estimates and falsification tests in Section 4.
In Section 5, we discuss potential explanations for the persistent effect of the slave trade
on medical trust. Section 6 concludes and discusses implications for present-day health
policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
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2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Conceptual Framework
The key difficulty in estimating a causal effect of trust on demand for vaccination is that it
is endogenous to health supply. Hence, to identify a causal effect from trust in medicine to
health behavior, one has to find some exogenous source of variation in trust in medicine.
In addition, as underlined by the recent Ebola outbreaks, medical distrust is widespread in
sub-Saharan Africa. As a consequence, one has to find some exogenous source of variation
in trust in medicine that could explain the continent-wide medical distrust phenomenon.
We need then a theory of how current trust in medicine is determined in the sub-
Saharan context. In their theoretical framework, Bisin and Verdier (2001) suggest that
current trust levels are shaped by both the contemporaneous environment and the cul-
tural traditions inherited from earlier generations. This implies that history shapes current
cultural traits such as trust levels. In the same vein but through a different mechanism,
cultural anthropology highlights that current norms of trust are determined by the persis-
tent optimality of previous norms of trust. In particular, when the historical environment
is such that norms of mistrust towards others were likely more beneficial than norms of
trust, optimal mistrusting behavior would have become more prevalent over time if the
environment stays similar.
In the sub-Saharan context, the pioneer work by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) in-
vestigates the historical origins of current differences in interpersonal trust across ethnic
groups and conclude to a negative causal impact of the slave trade. More specifically, they
find that ancestors’ historical exposure to the slave trade has an adverse effect on their de-
scendants’ trust in relatives, neighbors, co-ethnics, and locally elected people. Building on
African historiography, the authors explain this effect through the peculiar institutional
characteristics of the slave trade. While early in the slave trade, nearly all slaves were
taken in large-scale conflicts or raids, as the trade progressed, individuals began to turn
on others close to them, including neighbors, friends, and even family members, through
trickery and local kidnappings, to protect themselves (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). They
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also uncover that most of the impact of the slave trade channels through internal factors
to the individual, such as cultural norms and beliefs, rather than through external factors,
such as institutions.
The natural question we face, though, is why we expect that the slave trade affects
trust in medicine, in other words, why the resulting culture of mistrust could also affect
the medical sector. We know from Bowles (1998), echoing a rich literature in psychology,
that preferences learned under one set of circumstances become generalized reasons for
behavior (see Nisbett and Ross [1991] for a review). We could then expect that the slave
trade had imposed more general characteristic patterns of interaction on the people whose
ancestors were raided during the slave trade; that it had influenced their process of hu-
man development, affecting their personality, habits, commitments, identities, and values.
This, in turn, implies that the slave trade has explanatory power in situations distinct
from the institutional environment in which it initially prevailed. Thus, we hypothesize
that the slave trade has an impact also on current medical mistrust. Importantly, the
slave trade occurred over five centuries, from 1400 to 1900, and has transported tens of
millions of enslaved Africans. As a consequence, it has the feature of a widespread shock
in Africa’s history.
2.2 Slave Trade and Contemporaneous Mistrust in Medicine
To further base our argument on empirical evidence, we follow the baseline estimation
strategy in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) to investigate the impact of the slave trade on
current trust in medicine. More specifically, we combine their data on slave exports by
ethnic group with individual-level data from the 2005 Afrobarometer survey related to
the following questions about respondents’ perception of health workers’ trustworthiness:
“How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you
heard enough about them to say: Health workers?”3, as well as “Have you encountered
any problems of lack of attention or respect from staff in your local public clinic or hospital
during the past 12 months ?”4
3With effective response going from 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them.
4With effective response going from 0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times, 3=Often.
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We include all the relevant controls following Nunn and Wantchekon’s (2011) baseline
estimation. The results are reported in Table I below. They show that historical exposure
of the ancestors to the slave trade has a negative impact on descendants’ trust in public
health workers. In particular, respondents of the round 3 of the Afrobarometer that are
descendants from slave-raided ethnic groups are today significantly more likely to perceive
health workers as being corrupt and to have encountered problems of lack of attention
or respect when they last visited their public health facility. The size of the effect is
smaller than the one found by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) on different interpersonal
trust dimensions. However, this is in line with the fact that our outcome variable is much
more confined.
[Table I about here.]
To investigate whether the estimated negative effect of the slave trade on current
trust in health workers is not biased by differences in health supply in terms of price,
quantity and quality, we use the answers given by the same respondents related to such
dimensions.5 The results are reported in Table II. We find no significant relationship
between historical experience of the slave trade and current perception of health supply
dimensions. Overall, first-stage estimates confirm that historical exposure of ancestors to
the slave trade represents a relevant instrument for contemporaneous trust in medicine.
[Table II about here.]
2.3 Identification
The p-value for the instrument is not below 0.0016 (p-value = 0.012), suggesting that
the slave trade is a weak instrument. In the presence of weak instruments, we know that
hypothesis tests based on IV estimates are not correct. Instead, estimating the reduced
5The questions are formulated in the following way: “Have you encountered any of these problems
with your local public clinic or hospital during the past 12 months?” Then respondents had to answer
on different items: Too expensive; Lack of medicines/supplies; Absent doctors; Long waiting time; Dirty
facilities, with effective responses: 0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times, 3=Often.
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form linking current demand for vaccination to the slave trade, and to the other exogenous 
regressors, will provide better estimates (see Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008))6.
However, for the slave trade to impact current demand for vaccination only through 
mistrust in medicine, it needs to have no direct effect on current demand for vaccination, 
or any effect running through omitted variables. This restriction could be justified if 
controls for contemporaneous health supply and medical institutions are included. We 
know that the slave trade has differently affected regions within countries (Nunn 2008). 
It means that the slave trade could have a lasting effect on the sectoral composition of the 
current employment or public infrastructure endowments within countries, and this could 
affect regional health supply and institutions (even though our first stage estimates do 
not provide evidence for that). In addition, history of exposure to epidemics might vary 
across locations. We could then expect that areas that were more prone to epidemics, 
and hence more prone to preventive behavior, were less likely to be affected by the slave 
trade, and continue to be more in favor of preventive medicine today. To rule out these 
potential biases, we exploit variation in slave trade exposure across ethnic groups both 
within countries and districts.
Table A.3 in the Appendix Section A.1 presents summary statistics at the district level. 
The sample of interest includes 9726 districts (primary localities) from the 18 sub-Saharan 
African countries. There is an average of 1.70 ethnic groups by district with a standard 
deviation of 0.87. More than 25% of the districts have more than two ethnic groups, 
reaching a maximum of 7 different ethnic groups in some districts. There is an average of 16 
children under age five and of more than 11 respondent mothers by locality. The average 
measles vaccination rate is 66% with a standard deviation of 25 percentage points. The 
share of children from slave raided ethnic groups within districts is 80% with a standard 
deviation of 0.37.
The within-district estimation strategy implies that the source of identification is the 
movers in the sample (i.e., those who relocate from their ancestor’s original ethnic home-
land), who bring variation in the exposure to the slave trade across ethnic groups within
6In addition, the DHS does not collect any survey measures of trust in medicine, and it is not possible 
to match the data from the DHS with data on trust in medicine from the Afrobarometer.
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districts. While we can expect that movers may not be representative of the popula-
tion, we build on Casari et al. (2018) to argue that if our estimates are biased, they
are downward biased. In particular, Casari et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence and
a theoretical explanation for self-selection into migration by more trusting individuals
according to the origin and destination characteristics. They find that more trusting indi-
viduals are more likely to emigrate when the local fraction of trusting peers is low and the
destination characteristics make migration more attractive for the trusting. In our sam-
ple, 71% of the movers are from slave-raided ethnic groups, implying that their original
ethnic homeland is a slave-raided area. We know from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) that
slave-trade exposure is associated with more suspicious, less trusting, behaviors. We can
then infer that the local fraction of trusting peers in their place of origin is low for these
slave-raided movers and that they probably relocate in slave-free locations characterized
by better enforcement of civic behavior. This converges towards the selection of more
trusting individuals in our within-district estimation strategy, leading to a downward bias
of our estimates for the impact of the slave trade.
Alternatively, there may be unobservable historical events, cultural and social norms
that are correlated with selection into the slave trade and subsequent demand for vaccina-
tion. We hence include important ethnicity-level controls as additional regressors, related
to pre-colonial characteristics associated with initial cultural preferences for preventive
behavior and child investment, and to colonial characteristics associated with ethnic dis-
tance.
We further perform two falsification tests. If the slave trade affects demand for vac-
cination only through trust in medicine, then a negative relationship between slave trade
exposure and trust-insensitive health demand outcomes should not exist. Thus, we ex-
amine the reduced-form relationships between the slave trade and health outcomes that
exhibit sharp different degrees of trust sensitivity: the use of malaria insecticide-treated
nets on one side, and the consent to up-take a free anemia blood test on the other side.
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3 Data Sources and Description
In this section, we present the variables used in the analysis. The details about the exact
measures, summary statistics, and sources of all data are presented in Table A.1 in
the Appendix Section A.1.
3.1 Individual-level data
3.1.1 Slave Export Data
The historical data on slave exports by ethnic group comes from Nunn (2008). The author
combined data from various historical records that report the ethnic identities of slaves
exported from Africa with data on the number of slaves shipped from each African port
or region during the transatlantic and the Indian Ocean slave trades. The primary data
sources for slaves exports are from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database constructed
by Eltis et al. (1999) and from Austen (1979, 1988, 1992) for the Indian Ocean trades.
Nunn (2008) could then match a total of 80,656 slaves to 229 identified ethnic groups for
the transatlantic slave trade and 21,048 slaves to 80 distinct ethnic groups for the Indian
Ocean slave trade. In a final step, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) match the ethnic identity
recorded in the slave trade databases to the ethnic identity reported by respondents of
the Afrobarometer surveys, based on the historical classification by Murdock (1959).
We follow the same procedure for the ethnic designation reported by the respondents in
the DHS survey that we match when necessary to Murdock (1959) classification, allowing
a simple merge to Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) ethnic groups slave exporting data.
The matching goes from relatively simple correspondence (e.g., in the case of Uganda,
BaGanda or BaSoga ethnic group from DHS corresponds to GANDA and SOGA in the
Murdock classification) to slightly less straightforward correspondence (e.g., in the case of
Senegal, where PULAAR ethnic group in the DHS is related to FUTATORO in Murdock
ancient classification). In our study, we end up with a final sample of 98 ethnic groups
with 68 (69%) groups recorded as exporting slaves and 30 as slave-free. Each ethnic group
represents a minimal share of 5% of its country population.
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3.1.2 Vaccination Data
We combine the historical data on slave exports with DHS data from the most recent com-
patible surveys (collected between 2010 and 2014, except for Central Africa, Niger and
Ethiopia collected respectively in 1994, 1998 and 2003), and in particular the female mod-
ules questionnaires containing information on the immunization status of their children
born in the last 5 years. We restrict our interest to countries where geolocated survey data
exist and where the respondent’s ethnic group identity is reported. The baseline sample
in our study consists of 157,405 children born to 101,866 adult mothers from 98 ethnic
groups with a minimal size of 5% of each country population, covering 18 sub-Saharan
African countries.
We focus on a particular infectious and vaccine-preventable disease that is measles,
which remains one of the world-leading cause of children under-five mortality and mor-
bidity. In 2015, there were 134,200 measles deaths in the world, which amounts to about
367 deaths every day or 15 deaths every hour, with developing countries concentrating
more than 95% of these deaths (World Health Organization 2018). Even when it does
not lead to death, child infections might result in lifelong disability such as blindness,
deathless, or severe respiratory infections, undermining the child’s future education and
economic prospect. In addition, by focusing on a traditionally one-shot vaccine, we avoid
the complexity and sequentiality involved in other vaccines requiring multiple shots and
hence, more active computation, memory, and reasoning. Despite the vaccine effectiveness
and free provision by public health facilities, measles was the lowest-performing vaccine
in terms of coverage rate across sub-Saharan Africa in 2016, with an average country
coverage of 75% in 2016, and with no countries reaching the 95% herd immunity level.
A brief narrative description illustrates the ethnic group variations in immunization
rates that we will further investigate. In Burkina Faso and Uganda, for instance, there are
variations in coverage rate between ethnic groups according to the historical slave-trade
exposure. In Burkina Faso, the slave-free group Senufo scores 70% in measles coverage
compared to slave-raided groups like Fulani or related Gourmatche that score 60% and
64% respectively. In Uganda, the difference increases to 14 percentage points between the
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slave-raided Baganda and the slave-free Ngakarama.
3.1.3 Child, Mother and Household Data
The DHS also provides a rich set of questions we build upon to control for the child-
specific characteristics that might influence mother’s vaccination decisions, such as the
gender, the child’s birth-order, and an indicator for whether the child was delivered at
home or within a health facility.
We also have information about mother education, literacy status, employment status,
religion, age. We further include variables capturing mother’s level of information related
to public health issues, using answers to the questions of whether she watches TV or listens
to radio. We add a variable capturing the subjective assessment of access to health facility
using the mother answer to the question of whether distance to the health facility was a
problem or not. As mother’s fertility preferences have been shown to affect the investment
in child health and protection, we include the mother’s total births as well as mother’s
number of births during the last five years to control for close pregnancies. Importantly,
we also include the mother’s report of the ideal number of children and of unwanted last
birth as proxies for her adoption of contraceptives and hence her preferences regarding the
use of preventive health techniques in general. By introducing such controls, we expect to
take into account mothers’ specific characteristics associated with child investment and
preferences for adopting preventive health behavior and technology.
We also take into account the household’s socio-demographic characteristics, capturing
intra-household resources allocation and bargaining dimensions. In particular, we control
for father employment status, the household wealth index, the gender of the household
head and of the head for health decisions.
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3.2 Ethnicity-level Data
3.2.1 Pre-colonial Cultural Norms of Preventive behavior and Child Invest-
ment
As there may be unobservable historical events, cultural and social norms that are cor-
related with selection into the slave trade and subsequent vaccination decisions, it is
important to introduce important controls at the ethnic group level. In particular, we
could expect that ethnic groups that were culturally more inclined to adopt preventive
measures in general, and for children in particular, were less likely to be enrolled in the
slave trade, and continue to be more in favor of preventive medicine today. To rule out
this possibility, we control for ethnic group initial cultural norms of preventive behavior,
using data on pre-colonial ethnic group norms from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas
database. More specifically, in the African context, data on sexual norms, in particular
on girls premarital sexual behavior norms as well as on post-partum sexual norms, allow
to control for initial propensity to adopt preventive behavior. The former captures the
insistence on early female marriage or on virginity to prevent early pregnancy outside
marriage (by contrast to norms of promiscuous and freely permitted sexual behavior).
The latter captures the insistence on absence of post-partum sexual activity to prevent
repeated parturitions.
We further include indicators on the type of prevailing political succession, whether
hereditary or not. The rationale of this proxy is to capture parents incentives to invest
in their children health, knowing that hereditary lineage makes children be perceived
as future source of old-age insurance, labor and land income, and source of political
power. We also consider ethnic groups pre-colonial political centralization to capture
ethnic groups attitudes towards public authorities.
3.2.2 Colonial Controls for Ethnic Distance
We use data from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) to include dummies for colonial
intervention characteristics resulted in ethnic groups split across country borders as well as
in current minority or majority status in contemporaneous national borders. Split ethnic
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groups have been shown to be more prone to conflicts and to have lower national identity.
Thus, including this variable allows us to control for potential identity distance. In ad-
dition, including minority status allows to control for potential ethnic distance between
mother’s group and the one of the health worker or officers in charge of immunization,
that might lead to ethnic grievance or discrimination during health seeking interactions.
It allows also to control for the ethnic distance between mother’s ethnic group and the
ethnic group mainly represented by the local or central political power.
4 Estimating the Effect of Trust in Medicine on De-
mand for Vaccination
4.1 Reduced-form Estimates
As already highlighted in Section 2.3, our goal is to estimate the reduced form linking
contemporary demand for vaccination to ancestors’ exposure to the slave trade. As the
slave trade is correlated with trust in medicine, which in turn influences demand for vac-
cination, we ought to find a significant effect of the slave trade on demand for vaccination,
after controlling for the other determinants of demand for vaccination. Thus, we estimate
the following equation:
V accini,m,e,l,c = αlt + β Slavee +X
′
i,m,e,l,c Γ +X
′
m,e,l,c Ω (1)
+X′e Φ+ ǫi,m,e,l,c
where V accini,m,e,l,c,t is a binary indicator variable equal to one if child i born to mother
m from ethnic group e within locality l and country c is vaccinated against measles, and
zero otherwise. αlt denotes a vector of location-(survey) year interacted fixed effects.
Slavee is a binary indicator variable equal to one if the mother’s ethnic group e has
been slave-raided, and zero otherwise. X′i,m,e,l,c is a set of child individual controls, while
X′m,e,l,c is a set of mother/household controls. X
′
e includes ethnic-group level controls
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for pre-colonial cultural preferences for preventive behavior and child investment, and for 
colonial characteristics associated with ethnic distance. The standard errors are clustered 
at the ethnic group level. We estimate a linear probability model for ease of interpretation 
of the results.7
4.2 Results
Results are reported in Table 3. The estimates in Column 1 only reflect within-country-
year variations and are adjusted for individual, mother, district8, and ethnicity-level 
main characteristics, with standard errors clustered both at the ethnic group level, and 
at the ethnic group and district levels. The estimates in Column 2 reflect our baseline 
estimation, including district-year fixed effects.
The slave trade variable has a negative and significant estimated coefficient, as ex-
pected. More specifically, we find, in our most conservative specification associated with 
a downward bias of the slave trade effect (see discussion in Section 2.3), that a child born 
from a mother belonging to a slave raided ethnic group is around 5 percentage points 
less likely to be vaccinated against measles than a child whose mother is from a slave-
free ethnic group. To assess the magnitude of the slave export coefficient, we compare its 
explanatory power against standard determinants of demand for vaccination (see Table 
A.4 in the Appendix Section A.2). We find that the adverse effect of the slave trade is as 
important as the positive effect of belonging to the highest quintile of the income 
distribution, as important as the positive effect of employed mothers, and dominates the 
positive effect of literate mothers. Implementing a counterfactual analysis, we find that 
the estimate predicts a 25% increase (from 20 to 25%) in coverage rate for Hausa in 
Northern Nigeria — the ethnic group with the lowest immunization rate in our sample —
had they been a slave-free, leading to 50% drop in measles incidence rate, that is, 10,625
7Logit estimates produce similar results. See in the Appendix Section A.2 (Table A.6).
8We introduce a rich set of controls for the locality current economic development (density, luminosity 
at night), the geography (elevation, distance to water, to the sea, and to capital city), the existence of
natural resources (diamond mines, petroleum plants). We also include controls for the recent experience of
conflicts, violence and riots from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, as well as controls for
the district disease environment using the malaria stability index constructed by Kiszewski et al. (2004).
These controls are retrieved from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) and are spatially matched to
our DHS sample localities.
17
cases of infection avoided over two years between 2011 and 20149.
[Table III about here.]
Regarding the impact of the other regressors, as expected, we find that initial cultural
preferences for preventive behavior and child investments (captured respectively by sexual
norms and child heredity variable) have a positive and significant effect on current demand
for vaccination (see Table A.4 in the Appendix Section A.2). Interestingly, the size of the
effect is constant across the three variables. Identity and ethnic distances, captured by the
minority and split ethnic group variables, do not seem to have a significant impact on
demand for vaccination. Ethnic groups pre-colonial political centralization is negatively
associated with vaccines uptake.
4.3 Causal Mechanism: Falsification Tests
When we examine the reduced form, we find a strong negative relationship between an-
cestors exposure to the slave trade and their descendants demand for vaccination today.
This result is consistent with the first-stage estimates reported in Table I: ethnic groups
that were exposed to the slave trade have descendants that have a lower trust in medicine
today, and hence a lower demand for vaccination. Our strategy rests on the assumption
that mistrust in medicine is the only channel through which the slave trade affects cur-
rent demand for vaccination. If this assumption is correct, then a negative relationship
between slave trade exposure and trust-insensitive health demand outcomes should not
exist.
To assess the validity of the causal mechanism, we undertake the following falsification
test that investigates the reduced-form relationships between the slave trade and health
demand outcomes that involve sharp differences in terms of trust sensitivity: the use of
malaria insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) on one side, and the consent to an anemia blood
test on the other side.
9Hall and Jolley (2011) predict that a 1% increase in the MCV1 coverage rate is associated with a 
2% decrease in the disease incidence in the same year and the following year.
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The expectation that malaria preventives use does not imply any trust component
is in line with Dupas’s (2009) results. Using experimental variation in prices interacted
with experimental variation in framing and targeting strategies in Western Kenya, she
finds that liquidity constraint is the only barrier to the resort to ITNs. In addition, as for
measles, malaria is one of the deadliest infectious child diseases in sub-Saharan Africa,
and ITNs use does not imply any computation skills either. Nevertheless, it differs from
a vaccine injection by the technology that is used since there is no prick and injection
involved.
As for the free blood test consent, Lowes and Montero (2018a) use it as a proxy for
trust in medicine, underlining that it has the benefit of being a revealed preference measure
of trust rather than a self-reported measure. As the other two health demand outcomes,
it does not imply any computation skills. In terms of technology, it is more similar to
vaccine injection as it involves, even though non-invasive, a blood prick. However, it is
not related to any infectious disease.
We use the DHS female modules surveys that also provide information on mothers’
consent to a blood test and on their use of ITNs. Results are reported in Table IV. The first
column reports the reduced-form estimate of the relationship between mothers’ ancestors
exposure to the slave trade and their use of ITN today. Column 2 reports the same
reduced-form estimate with the blood test consent as outcome variable. The findings
are in line with our predictions. We estimate a statistically insignificant relationship
between slave trade historical exposure and contemporaneous use of malaria preventive
ITN, with a point estimate close to zero, but a statistically significant and sizeable negative
relationship between slave trade historical exposure and today blood test consent.
[Table IV about here.]
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5 How to Explain the Persistent Effect of the Slave
Trade?
In this paper, we have established the adverse effect of past exposure to the slave trade on
current trust in medicine and subsequent demand for vaccination. The natural question
that we face, though, is how to explain the persistence of this effect. The persistence of
preferences, beliefs and norms of behavior is an object of study of several social sciences,
among which economics and evolutionary anthropology. Both approaches have underlined
different mechanisms that we discuss, and test when possible, in this Section.
5.1 Understanding Cultural Transmission Mechanisms Inside
the Family
In the economic literature, cultural transmission is formalized as the result of decisions
made inside the family (corresponding to the vertical channel of cultural transmission,
from parents to children) (Bisin and Verdier 2001, 2011). A fundamental assumption in
these economic models, called “imperfect empathy”, implies that parents, while altruistic,
tend to prefer children with their own cultural traits. Therefore, as the intergenerational
transmission of cultural traits involves economic decisions of rational agents (the cultural
parents), an important implication of these models is that the transmission mechanism
is not necessarily monotonically increasing in the exogenous material payoffs associated
to cultural traits. Thus, according to Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) theoretical model, both
parents’ preferences and value of their children welfare are likely to explain vertical inter-
generational transmission of cultural values.
In particular, we expect cultural transmission of traditional norms to be more im-
portant when individuals consistently lay more emphasis on traditions. Among our
mother-level variables, religious affiliation, and more specifically, affiliation to traditional
African pre-colonial religions (after centuries of monotheist religions (Islam and Chris-
tianity) spread across Africa) might capture higher preferences for traditional values and
norms, and hence a higher persistence of norms of behavior inherited from historical
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shocks. Table V, Panel A, shows the heterogeneous impact of past exposure to the slave
trade across religious affiliations. When our main explanatory variable is interacted with
the dummy variable traditional religion (column (1)), we find that the negative effect of
slave trade exposure more than double. By contrast, when our main explanatory variable
is interacted with the other religious affiliation dummy variables, we find that the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term is not significantly different from 0, even though the results
show that cultural transmission is more important through Catholic than Protestant and
Islam religious affiliation (column (2), (3) and (4)). This finding is consistent with Bisin
et al.’s (2004) result with respect to asymmetric ‘relative intolerance’ parameters across
religious traits.
Cultural transmission is also expected to be more important when parents value more
their children’s welfare. Therefore, we interact our main explanatory variable with the
ethnicity-level dummy variable with respect to pre-colonial type of political succession,
whether hereditary or not (Table V, Panel B, column (1)). The coefficient of the inter-
action term is highly insignificant. We further investigate whether the type of hereditary
succession – matrilineal or patrilineal – plays a role in cultural transmission. As a mat-
ter of fact, in matrilineal lineage systems, by definition, women are key for determining
descent. This implies that in these systems children represent part of women’s outside
option, as their kin group has an interest in the well-being of the children10. As a conse-
quence, women value more their children’s welfare in matrilineal lineage systems11. This
in turn could lead to higher cultural transmission relative to patrilineal lineage systems,
as it is consistently women that are in charge of children education in the sub-Saharan
African context. Therefore, we expect the slave trade adverse effect on current trust in
medicine to be more important for slave-raided ethnic groups with matrilineal lineage.
When our main explanatory variable is interacted with the dummy variable matrilineal
10This is the reason why a large literature in anthropology suggests that matrilineal systems reduce
spousal cooperation (Radcliffe-Brown 1950; Gluckman 1963; Richards 1950; Douglas 1969).
11Note that consistent with this theory, we expect that matrilineal systems lead to better children
health outcomes. Our results confirm this hypothesis: the coefficient of matrilineal dummy itself is
positive and highly significant. More specifically, a child born from a mother belonging to a matrilineal
ethnic group is 18 percentage points more likely to be vaccinated against measles than a child whose
mother is from a patrilineal ethnic group. Lowes and Montero (2018b) find similar results.
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lineage, we find that the negative effect of slave trade exposure is multiplied by four (Panel
B, column (2)). This considerable effect is highly significant.
[Table V about here.]
5.2 Understanding the Persistent Optimality of Mistrust in Me-
dicine
In the evolutionary anthropology literature, as highlighted by Giuliano and Nunn (2019),
a class of models predicts that cultural persistence is determined by the similarity of
the environment across generations. More specifically, within these models, when the
environment is similar across generations, the traits that have evolved up to the previous
generation are likely to be also optimal for the current generation.
For the object of our study, this perspective implies that the persistent effect of the
slave trade on trust in medicine is explained by the similarity of the environment across
generations. It is now acknowledged that the colonial period was associated with abusive
medical treatments. French, British, and Belgian colonial governments implemented a
wide variety of medical campaigns beginning in the early 20th century in order to eradicate
several diseases, mainly sleeping sickness but also yaws, malaria, leprosy, and yellow fever
(Headrick 1994; Pepin 2011; Headrick 2014). In order to achieve a good coverage during
these campaigns, the military used to force villagers to participate and used medications
with considerable side effects12.
Furthermore, there is also a large body of anecdotal evidence from Africa of more
contemporaneous abusive clinical trials. Katz et al. (1972), Fost (1998), Meier (2002), and
Washington (2007a, 2007b) provides telling examples of medical misbehavior in different
countries and contexts: Dr. Basson involved in the murder, by poisoning, of hundreds of
blacks in South Africa and Namibia from 1979 to 1987; patients murder by lethal medical
injections in Zimbabwe and Zambia during the 1980s and 1990s; AZT treatments testing
in Africa in 1994; thalidomide treatment for leprosy in Africa in the 1990’s; unethical
medical experiments on black breast-cancer patients in South Africa in 2000, among others
12Lowes and Montero (2018a) document the peculiar case of Central Africa.
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instances. A testimony of the importance of these mistreatments is the film release in 2005
“The Constant Gardener”, by Fernando Meirelles, based on the real-life meningococcal
meningitis abusive testing in Kano, Nigeria, in 1996.
The fact that Africans have become the subjects of dangerous therapeutics is explained
by the increasing strictness of rules that apply in the West. Washington (2007a) mentions
this quote from Robert F. Murray, M.D., chief of the Division of Medical Genetics at
Howard University, who warned in 1994: “People are going overseas trying to do research
in Africa. They are saying, ‘We don’t have to go through all that IRB13 stuff to study
AIDS, sickle cell and other diseases. This sort of questionable research is now going on in
Africa and Third World countries because there are plentiful patients and the scientists are
not subject to the same restrictions they are now subjected to here.” (Washington 2007a,
p. 390). The African public-health vacuum might also be endogenous to corrupt central
governments or leaders that try to get money from international donors.
6 Conclusion
This article seeks to better understand the global phenomenon of contemporaneous med-
ical distrust in sub-Saharan Africa resulting in major health program failures. One of the
contributions of this paper is to provide theoretical explanation and empirical evidence
that the slave trade emerges as an important determinant of current trust in medicine.
We have then pointed out that it is a valid instrument for trust in medicine in the reduced-
form relationship between ancestors’ exposure to the slave trade and current demand for
vaccination, holding constant any unobserved local variable and including a rich set of
relevant ethnicity-level controls for pre-colonial and colonial characteristics. Leading to
the second and main contribution of this study: The slave trade is an important determi-
nant of current demand for vaccination, more important than the standard socio-economic
factors. The next natural step is to try to understand the persistent effect of the slave
trade on trust in medicine. We provide explanations that are consistent with both eco-
nomic and evolutionary anthropology approaches. We identify religious affiliations and
13Stands for Institutional Review Board for protection of human subjects in research.
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matrilineal lineage systems as specific important cultural transmission mechanisms, and
we point to the similarity of the environment across generations due to colonial and con-
temporaneous abusive medical treatments to explain persistence of optimal mistrusting
behavior inherited from the slave trade.
The implications for present-day health policy in sub-Saharan Africa are twofold.
First, one way to alleviate the persistent culture of mistrust is to increase the environmen-
tal mismatch by reducing contemporaneous medical misbehavior in Africa. This implies
strengthening the institutional and legal frameworks and improving the regulation of all
actors in the health sector. The second important implication of our results is that there
is no one-size-fits-all health policy. In particular, given that different levels of trust and
hence propensity to adopt preventive technologies exist between ethnic groups, health
intervention design could be improved by leveraging cooperation from early adopters.
Such strategy might be useful to generate the early benefits of externalities in preventive
health.✯
✯Authors’ affiliation: University of Lausanne
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A Appendices
A.1 Data Description
[Table A.1 about here.]
[Table A.2 about here.]
[Table A.3 about here.]
A.2 Complementary Results
[Table A.4 about here.]
[Table A.5 about here.]
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Table I: OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Trust in Health Workers
Corrupt health workers Lack of attention/respect
(1) (2)
ln (1 + exports/area) 0.0506** 0.0611**
(0.0201) (0.0280)
Individual controls Yes Yes
Districts controls Yes Yes
Ethnicity-level colonial controls Yes Yes
Colonial population density Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Number of observations 17829 16701
Number of ethnicity clusters 187 187
Number of district clusters 1292 1292
R-Squared 0.057 0.097
The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent in the 3rd round
of the Afrobarometer survey. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnicity and
district levels. The slave export variable ln(1+exports/area) is the natural log of one plus slave exports
normalized by land area. The individual controls follow Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) full controls.
They include the respondent age, age squared, five living conditions fixed effects, ten education fixed
effects, 18 religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respon-
dent lives in an urban location. The district controls include ethnic fractionalization in the district
and the share of the district’s population that is the same ethnicity as the respondent. Ethnicity-
level colonial controls include the prevalence of malaria, a 1400 urbanization indicator variable, eight
fixed effects for the sophistication of precolonial settlement, the number of jurisdictional political hi-
erarchies beyond the local community in the precolonial period, an indicator for integration with the
colonial rail network, an indicator for contact with pre-colonial European explorers, and the number
of missions per square kilometer during colonial rule. Colonial population density is the natural log
of an ethnicity’s population density during the colonial period. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table II: OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Health Supply Perception (Price, Quantity
and Quality)
Costs Medicine supplies Absence of doctors Waiting-time Dirty clinic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (1 + exports/area) 0.0262 -0.0142 0.0201 -0.0101 0.0307
(0.0336) (0.0273) (0.0231) (0.0261) (0.0267)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Districts controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity-level colonial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16823 16706 16497 16713 16476
Number of ethnicity clusters 187 187 187 187 187
Number of district clusters 1292 1292 1292 1292 1292
R-Squared 0.199 0.172 0.121 0.111 0.082
The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent in the 3rd round of the Afrobarom-
eter survey. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnicity and district levels. The slave export
variable ln(1+exports/area) is the natural log of one plus slave exports normalized by land area. The individual con-
trols follow Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) full controls. They include the respondent age, age squared, five living
conditions fixed effects, ten education fixed effects, 18 religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, and an indica-
tor for whether the respondent lives in an urban location. The district controls include ethnic fractionalization in the
district and the share of the district’s population that is the same ethnicity as the respondent. Ethnicity-level colonial
controls include the prevalence of malaria, a 1400 urbanization indicator variable, eight fixed effects for the sophisti-
cation of precolonial settlement, the number of jurisdictional political hierarchies beyond the local community in the
precolonial period, an indicator for integration with the colonial rail network, an indicator for contact with pre-colonial
European explorers, and the number of missions per square kilometer during colonial rule. Colonial population density
is the natural log of an ethnicity’s population density during the colonial period. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table III: LPM Estimates of the Determinants of Measles Vaccination
Measles Vaccine
(1) (2)
Group exports slaves (=1) -0.0902*** -0.0457**
(0.0251) (0.0206)
[0.0250]
Child controls Yes Yes
Mother controls Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes
Ethnic pre-colonial controls Yes Yes
Ethnic colonial controls Yes Yes
District controls Yes No
Country x Survey-Year FE Yes No
District x Survey-Year FE No Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.154 0.210
N observations 80088 81280
N mothers 101866 55257
Number of ethnicity clusters 98 64
Number of district clusters 9726 7325
The table reports LPM estimates. Below the coefficients, two
standard errors are reported: in parentheses are standard errors
adjusted for clustering within ethnic groups, in square brack-
ets are standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering within
ethnic groups and districts. Child controls include: sex of the
child, the order of birth, a dummy for home delivery. Mother
controls: education, literacy status, employment status, religion,
age, access to health facility, total children, birth interval, ideal
number of children, unwanted births, watch TV, listen to radio.
Household controls: father employment status, the gender of
the houshold head, the household wealth index, mother makes
health decision. Ethnic pre-colonial controls include dummies
for norms of: child heredity, postpartum sex taboo, rigidity of
girls premarital sexual behavioral norms, past-political central-
ization. Ethnic colonial controls: split across country borders,
current minority status. District controls: density, luminosity
at night, elevation, distance to water, to the sea, and to capital
city, existence of natural resources (diamond mines, petroleum
plants), recent experience of conflicts, violence and riots, dis-
ease environment using the malaria stability index. *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table IV: LPM Estimates of the Determinants of ITN Use and Anemia Hemoglobin Test
Consent
Use Malaria ITN Net Accept Anemia Test
(1) (2)
Group exports slaves (=1) -0.0019 -0.0250***
(0.0142) (0.0083)
Child controls Yes Yes
Mother controls Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes
Ethnic pre-colonial controls Yes Yes
Ethnic colonial controls Yes Yes
District x Survey-Year FE Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.338 0.204
N observations 82199 31471
N mothers 53216 20711
Number of ethnicity clusters 59 45
Number of district clusters 6884 4326
The table reports LPM estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within eth-
nic groups. Child controls include: sex of the child, the order of birth, a dummy for home
delivery. Mother controls: education, literacy status, employment status, religion, age,
access to health facility, total children, birth interval, ideal number of children, unwanted
births, watch TV, listen to radio. Household controls: father employment status, the
gender of the houshold head, the household wealth index, mother makes health decision.
Ethnic pre-colonial controls include dummies for norms of: child heredity, postpartum sex
taboo, rigidity of girls premarital sexual behavioral norms, past-political centralization.
Ethnic colonial controls: split across country borders, current minority status. *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table V: The Effect of Historical Slave Trade Exposure on Today Demand for Vaccination,
Depending on Cultural Transmission Preferences
Dep.Var: Measles Vaccine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Preferences for traditions
Group exports slaves (=1) -0.0457** -0.0595*** -0.0427** -0.0444*
(0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0205) (0.0227)
Group exports slaves (=1) X Traditionnal religion (=1) -0.0708**
(0.0334)
Group exports slaves (=1) X Muslim (=1) 0.0312
(0.0201)
Group exports slaves (=1) X Catholics (=1) -0.0208
(0.0133)
Group exports slaves (=1) X Protestants (=1) -0.0033
(0.0131)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x Survey-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 81280 81280 81280 81280
Adj. R-squared 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210
Panel B: Values of children’s welfare
Group exports slaves(=1) -0.0398** -0.0349*
(0.0183) (0.0189)
Group exports slaves(=1) X Child heredity (=1) -0.0141
(0.0351)
Group exports slaves(=1) X Matriarchy (=1) -0.1700***
(0.0514)
Baesline controls Yes Yes
District x Survey-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 81280 81280
Adj.R-squared 0.210 0.210
The table reports LPM estimates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering
within ethnic groups. Panel A and Panel B are estimated as in our baseline controls where child controls
include: sex of the child, the order of birth, a dummy for home delivery. Mother controls: education, lit-
eracy status, employment status, religion, age, access to health facility, total children, birth interval, ideal
number of children, unwanted births, watch TV, listen to radio. Household controls: father employment
status, the gender of the houshold head, the household wealth index, mother makes health decision. Eth-
nic pre-colonial controls include dummies for norms of: child heredity, postpartum sex taboo, rigidity of
girls premarital sexual behavioral norms, past-political centralization. Ethnic colonial controls: split across
country borders, current minority status. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.1: Variable description and data source
Variables Description Source
Group exports slaves Dummy variable for ethnic group ex-
porting
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
Employment Dummy variables for parents’ employ-
ment
Demographic Health Survey
Mother age Reported age of the mother Demographic Health Survey
Mother education Reported number of education years Demographic Health Survey
Literacy Categorical variable for effective abil-
ity to read during survey
Demographic Health Survey
Female household head Dummy variable for households
headed by females
Demographic Health Survey
Mother makes health decisions Dummy for child health decisions
made by the mother
Demographic Health Survey
Wealth Index Categorical variable for the household
level of income
Demographic Health Survey
Listen to radio Frequency of listening to radio Demographic Health Survey
Watch TV Frequency of watching TV Demographic Health Survey
Religion Categorical variable for the reported
religion
Demographic Health Survey
Total births Categorical variable for the mother’s
life time birth records
Demographic Health Survey
Close pregnancies (last 5 years) Number of births during the last five
years
Demographic Health Survey
Ideal number of children Mothers reported ideal number of chil-
dren
Demographic Health Survey
Not wanted last child Dummy variable for undesired last
child
Demographic Health Survey
Distance to health facility Dummy variable for distance to health
facility is a problem
Demographic Health Survey
Child birth order Categorical variable for the child birth
order
Demographic Health Survey
Sex of child Dummy variable for female child Demographic Health Survey
Home delivery Dummy variable for a child delivery at
home instead of medical facility
Demographic Health Survey
Ethnic Centralization Dummy for ethnic group pre-colonial
political centralization
Murdock Ethnographic Atlas (1959)
Split ethnic group Ethnic group split during colonial pe-
riod
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2016)
Ethnic minority status Dummy variable coded for groups out-
side majority
Demographic Health Survey
Child Hereditary Succession Dummy variable coded from indicator
on type of political hereditary succes-
sion
Murdock Ethnographic Atlas (1959)
Matriarchy Dummy variable for child matrilineal
political succession
Murdock Ethnographic Atlas (1959)
Postpartum sex-taboos Dummy variable coded from indicator
on historical norms of postpartum sex-
taboos
Murdock Ethnographic Atlas (1959)
Rigidity of sexual norms Dummy variable coded from indicator
on historical norms of premarital sex-
ual behavior of girls
Murdock Ethnographic Atlas (1959)
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Panel A: Child variables
Sex of child 157405 0.49 0.50 0 1
Birth order (Age < 5 years) 157405 2.12 0.72 1 3
Child home delivery 156610 0.43 0.50 0 1
Measles 144375 0.62 0.49 0 1
Panel B: Mother and household variables
Female household head 101866 0.20 0.40 0 1
Mother Age 101866 28 7.19 15 49
Mother employed 97589 0.67 0.47 0 1
Mother education years 101866 4 1.59 0 8
Mother literacy 95390 0.41 0.49 0 1
Health decisions female 80016 0.48 0.50 0 1
Problem distant health services 134258 0.46 0.50 0 1
Accept hemoglobin test 35019 0.97 0.17 0 1
Adult sleep under net 90474 0.49 0.50 0 1
Total births last 5 years 101866 1.49 0.62 1 5
Ideal number of children 90919 5.59 2.75 0 40
Non desired last child 97461 0.26 0.44 0 1
Total children 101866 3.81 2.48 1 17
Father employed 91558 0.99 0.10 0 1
Wealth Index 95891 2.79 1.41 1 5
Listen to radio 95784 0.65 0.48 0 1
Watch TV 95756 0.39 0.49 0 1
Muslim 101722 0.43 0.49 0 1
Catholics 101722 0.19 0.39 0 1
Protestants 101722 0.33 0.47 0 1
Traditionnal religion 101722 0.03 0.17 0 1
Panel C: Ethnic group variables
Ethnic group exports slaves 101866 0.80 0.40 0 1
Ethnic centralization 82367 0.66 0.48 0 1
Ethnic child heredity 101866 0.44 0.50 0 1
Ethnic matriarcat 84366 0.17 0.38 0 1
Ethnic post-partum sex taboo 101866 0.30 0.46 0 1
Ethnic rigidity of sexual norms 101866 0.22 0.42 0 1
Ethnic colonial Split 101866 0.52 0.50 0 1
Ethnic minority 101866 0.61 0.49 0 1
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Table A.3: Summary statistics at the district level
Obs. Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Number of ethnic groups 9726 1.70 0.87 1 7
Number of children 9726 16.18 11.92 1 91
Number of mothers 9726 11.08 7.42 1 54
Measles vacc. rate 9707 0.66 0.25 0 1
Group exports slaves 9726 0.80 0.37 0 1
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Table A.4: LPM Estimates of the Determinants of Measles Vaccination
Measles
Ethnic group exports slave -0.0457**
(0.0206)
Ethnic group Pre-colonial centralization -0.0257**
(0.0105)
Split ethnic group during colonial period -0.0127
(0.0087)
Minority group 0.0217*
(0.0110)
Pre-colonial Cultural Norms of Child Investment: Type of Hereditary Succession
Child Heredity 0.0326**
(0.0140)
Pre-colonial Cultural Norms of Preventive behavior
Postpartum sex taboo 0.0312***
(0.0081)
Insistence on early female marriage or on girls virginity 0.0348***
(0.0123)
Household socio-demographics:
Father employed (=1) 0.0174
(0.0170)
Mother employed (=1) 0.0465***
(0.0062)
Mother Age 0.0629***
(0.0060)
Mother education (years) 0.0009
(0.0015)
Literacy ( Ref:Not able to read)
Read partially 0.0202***
(0.0068)
Read adequately 0.0376***
(0.0055)
Distance to health facility is a problem(=1) -0.0154**
(0.0063)
Female household head -0.0137**
(0.0062)
Mother makes health decisions 0.0100***
(0.0037)
Listen to radio 0.0061**
(0.0023)
Watch Tv 0.0072
(0.0043)
continued in Table X
38
Table A.5: LPM Estimates of the Determinants of Measles Vaccination (continued)
Wealth Index Quantile ( Ref:poorest)
2nd quantile 0.0085
(0.0053)
3rd quantile 0.0193***
(0.0062)
4th quantile 0.0355***
(0.0097)
5th quantile 0.0504***
(0.0127)
Religion (ref:Muslim)
Catholic 0.0176
(0.0110)
Protestant 0.0062
(0.0091)
Traditional -0.0296*
(0.0152)
Others -0.0238
(0.0147)
Mother Births History(Ref: ≤2)
Life time total births (3/4) 0.0805***
(0.0069)
Life time total births (≥5) 0.2133***
(0.0131)
Close Births (last 5 years) -0.0510***
(0.0045)
Mother fertility preferences
Ideal number of children (N) 0.0023**
(0.0011)
Not wanted last children 0.0011
(0.0050)
Child birth order (Ref: ≤2)
Birth order (2/4) -0.1172***
(0.0105)
Birth order (5/18) -0.3088***
(0.0225)
Sex of child (female=1) 0.0088***
(0.0033)
Home delivery (=1) -0.0289**
(0.0143)
Location x Survey-Year FE Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.210
N Observations 81280
The table reports LPM estimates of the remaining explanatory variables in the baseline
estimation in column (2) of Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ad-
justed for clustering within ethnic groups as in our baseline specification in column (2) of
Table 3. Child controls include: sex of the child, the order of birth, a dummy for home de-
livery. Mother controls: education, literacy status, employment status, religion, age, access
to health facility, total children, birth interval, ideal number of children, unwanted births,
watch TV, listen to radio. Household controls: father employment status, the gender of the
household head, the household wealth index, mother makes health decision. Ethnic pre-
colonial controls include dummies for norms of: child heredity, postpartum sex taboo, rigid-
ity of girls premarital sexual behavioral norms, past-political centralization. Ethnic colo-
nial controls: split across country borders, current minority status. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Measles Vaccination
Measles Use Malaria ITN Net Accept Anemia Test
(1) (2) (3)
Group exports slaves (=1) -0.2291*** 0.0017 -0.9253***
(0.0818) (0.0983) (0.3436)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes
Mother controls Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic pre-colonial controls Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic colonial controls Yes Yes Yes
District x Survey-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -33166.94 -30914.29 -1343.96
N observations 73893 68063 4213
Number of districts 5439 4395 4213
The table reports logit survey-year fixed-effects estimates as specified in the baseline specification in col-
umn (2) of Table 3. Child controls include: sex of the child, the order of birth, a dummy for home deliv-
ery. Mother controls: education, literacy status, employment status, religion, age, access to health facil-
ity, total children, birth interval, ideal number of children, unwanted births, watch TV, listen to radio.
Household controls: father employment status, the gender of the household head, the household wealth
index, mother makes health decision. Ethnic pre-colonial controls include dummies for norms of: child
heredity, postpartum sex taboo, rigidity of girls premarital sexual behavioral norms, past-political cen-
tralization. Ethnic colonial controls: split across country borders, current minority status.* p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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